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STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERMIT FEES CHARGED
TO FEDERAL FACILITIES: DISTINGUISHING LEGAL
USER FEES FROM ILLEGAL TAXES
Samuel D. McVey*
Federal facilities are generally subject to state environmental
regulations including requirements that pollution-related activities
operate under state permits. States issue these permits for waste and
pollution generating, handling, and disposal activities. State laws
normally require that fees be paid before permits may be issued.
These "permit fees" can be substantial. In fact, the fees can be so
large or unrelated to the cost of the permits as to be unconstitutional
state taxes when levied upon the national government.
At least one case is pending on this issue in federal district
courts and one other has recently been decided.' In addition, many
claims or demands are being made administratively throughout the
country between federal and state agencies. It is probable that some
of the more significant disputes will also result in litigation. This
article suggests an analysis for determining the constitutionality of
state environmental permit fees imposed on federal instrumentalities.
Application of the analysis is then illustrated through examination of
a typical state permit statute. Finally, concerns for parties involved
in settling fee disputes are outlined.
I. CONGRESSIONAL WAIVER OF FEDERAL IMMUNITY TO STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
In recent years, Congress has waived federal immunity to state
environmental programs which meet federal standards. Congress has
mandated that federal facilities comply with state substantive and
procedural requirements for control of air, water, and solid or haz-
© 1989 by Samuel D. McVey
* Attorney, Kirton, McConkie & Poelman, Salt Lake City, Utah; Major, Judge Advo-
cate Division, United States Marine Corps Reserve; B.S., 1977, United States Naval Academy;
J.D., 1983, Brigham Young University.
1. See United States v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., No. 89-0548 (C.D.
Cal. filed Jan. 30, 1989) (seeking declaratory relief that permit fees are unconstitutional
taxes); Maine v. Department of the Navy, 702 F. Supp 322 (D. Maine 1988) (denying de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment).
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ardous waste pollution. The most sweeping example of a congres-
sional waiver occurs in section 118 of the Clean Air Act:'
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any property or facility . . . shall be
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, Interstate, and
local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air pollution
in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovern-
mental entity. The preceding statement shall apply (A) to any
requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any
record keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement re-
specting permits and any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to
the exercise of any Federal, State, or local administrative au-
thority, and (C) to any process and sanction, whether enforced
in Federal, State, or local courts or in any other manner .... .
Similar, but less broad, waivers can be found in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act4 and in the Clean Water Act.' Both
of these acts subject federal entities to the "payment of reasonable
service charges" to state environmental agencies." Waivers also exist
in other statutes intended to regulate or prevent pollution of the na-
tion's resources.7
In addition to making federal facilities subject to state environ-
mental regulations, Congress has authorized the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency to delegate authority to the states authority which
permits the implementation and enforcement of most environmental
protection standards.' As a result of this delegation of power, states
are becoming the primary enforcers and implementers of environ-
mental protection programs.9 State programs must, at a minimum,
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982). See also Donnelly & Van Ness, The Warrior and the
Druid-the DOD and Environmnental Law, 33 FED. B. NEws & J. 37, 38-39 (Jan. 1986).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
4. Id. § 6961. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act deals with solid and haz-
ardous waste handling and disposal.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982). The Clean Water Act is also known as the "Federal
Water Pollution Control Act" (33 U.S.C.A. § 1251 (Historical Note, "Short Title")). See also
the provisions of the Defense Environmental Restoration Act contained in the "Superfund
Amendments" at 10 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(3) (Supp. 1987).
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982).
7. These statutes include: the Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b) (1982); the
Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982); and the Safe Water Drinking
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a) (1982). Exec. Order No. 12,088, 42 Fed. Reg. 47, 708 (1978), also
requires federal agencies to cooperate with state and local entities to control pollution.
8. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (1982).
9. Stever, Perspectives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for Environmental
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produce environmental cleanliness at a level which complies with
certain federal standards. Therefore, states cannot forego regulation
of federal facilities. Absent compliance by federal installations, many
states could not meet the pollution standards required under federal
law."0
The states must find sufficient resources to finance their envi-
ronmental protection programs, including their regulation of federal
installations. The national government is considered a reliable source
of money. Consequently, state agencies attempt to extract money
from federal installations in the form of "permit fees.""
Contamination, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 110, 114 (1987).
10. See, 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3.03(7)(0 (1987 Supp.).
States must meet federal pollution control standards such as "National Ambient Air Quality
Standards." 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). The national government has facilities which produce
pollution in every state in the union. See DEP'T OF DEF., DEF. ENVTL RESTORATION PRO-
GRAM, ANN. REP. TO CONG. FOR FISCAL YEAR 1987, 76 (Feb. 12, 1988); Federal Facilities
Docket, 53 Fed. Reg. 4280-303 (1988). It is commonly noted that the federal government owns
one-third of the nation's land. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND
AND RESOURCES LAW 2 (1981). Thus, the potential for pollution on and from federal installa-
tions and enclaves is great.
11. At least one effort to collect permit fees has made its way into federal court. Declar-
atory relief is being sought in another case. United States v. South Coast Air Quality Manage-
ment Dist., No. 89-0548 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 30, 1989).
There is no requirement that states regulate polluters through a permit program, but
virtually all do. In the air pollution context, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.50-52.2632 (1989). See also
ALA. CODE §§ 22-28-23(b), (g) (Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.160(b), (h) (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-426.D (Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2-209, 8-4-304, 8-
105 (1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42311 (West 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-
115(5)(b) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-174(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 17, §§ 6003, 6006(5) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403.087(1), (5) (West
Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2709 (Supp. 1987); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 342-46(c), 342-
24 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-115, 39 -119 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 ,
1022.8(g), 1039.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-10-1, 13-7-16-6(Burns 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B-105, 455B-105(12.b), 455B-134 (West Supp.
1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3008 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.033 919), 920),
224.120 (Baldwin 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1065.C, .D, 30-1085 (West Supp.
1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 352 (Supp.1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2, §§ 401-03(1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 142B (West 1983); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
14.58(5)(a), (14)(a) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116.07(4a), (4d) (West 1987);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-17-29(1) (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 643.075(1), (8) (Vernon
1988); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 75-2-211(2) (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1507(3) (Supp.
1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 445.491 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-C:11, 12 (Supp.
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2C-9(a), -9.2 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-7(A)(1)(1987); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. L. §§ 19-0302, 70-0109, 70-0117 (Consol. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 143-215.108, 143-215.112(d) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-25-04.1 (Supp. 1987);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3704.03, 3704.05 (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82,§§ 932, 936(g) (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 468.065 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,§ 4006.1(0 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-23-5(j), (k), 23-23-9 (1979); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-1-100 (Law. Co-op. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-1-21 (Supp. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-25-105(b)(2) (1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-5, 3.29
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The permits for which these fees are charged are intended to
license the operation of boilers, incinerators, landfills, storage tanks,
and other waste producing and handling facilities. Additionally, the
permits allow the states to monitor polluting activities. The fees for
permitting any single operation can total thousands of dollars.
The national government obviously must pay user fees for ser-
vices or goods it receives. However, as will be shown, there is a fun-
damental difference between these user fees and actual taxes. While
in some instances Congress has required that federal facilities pay
permit fees which are "reasonable service charges, ' ' "a Congress has
not gone so far as to expressly waive general federal immunity to
state taxes. If the "fees" imposed by the states are so large or unre-
lated to the permit process as to actually constitute a "tax," then
federal facilities do not have statutory or constitutional authority to
pay them.
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES DO NOT ALLOW
STATE AGENCIES TO EXTRACT TAXES FROM THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT; STATES MAY ONLY COLLECT REASONABLE USER
FEES
A discussion of whether the national government must pay state
taxes masquerading as permit fees must begin with an inquiry into
whether Congress has rendered the federal government liable for
such taxes. The national government is generally immune to pay-
ment of state taxes imposed upon national instrumentalities. 3 The
sovereign immunity of the federal government to state taxation is
based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 4
The Supremacy Clause requires that for Congress effectively to
waive federal immunity with regard to state environmental taxes,
(Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-13-27 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
2822, tit. 10, § 555(c) (1987); VA. CODE ANN §§ 10-17.30:1 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
70.94.151(2) (Supp. 1980); W. VA. CODE § 16-20-116 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
144.3935-144.399 (West Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 35-1-801 (1977).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1982); 58 Comp. Gen. 244, 246-48 (1979).
13. This principle dates back to McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The national government may tax a number of state
functions. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579-82 (1946); Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 463-64 (1978). State immunity from federal taxation has been
judicially inferred from the constitutional scheme of federalism. In contrast, states do not have
as wide a latitude in taxing federal activities because immunity is derived directly from the
constitutional provisions of the supremacy clause. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 405-06 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: 1789-1801, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981).
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there must be an unequivocal congressional statement to that effect.' 5
Although imposition of taxes raises constitutional concerns, sov-
ereigns may constitutionally impose reasonable "user fees" or "ser-
vice charges" on one another for services rendered or received. 6
Therefore, it is evident that the national government may be re-
quired to pay for the value of services it receives from any source,
including the states.
Generally, the language in federal environmental statutes makes
federal entities subject to "reasonable service charges," or to state
substantive and procedural requirements in the same manner as pri-
vate persons."7 However, this language does not constitute an express
waiver to state taxing authority. In the 1976 decision of Hancock v.
Train,' the United States Supreme Court dealt with a Clean Air
Act provision which stated that the federal government "shall comply
with Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting
control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any
person is subject to such requirements . . .,,"
The Court in Hancock held that the statutory provision did not
require that federal facilities comply with the state permit and re-
porting requirements at issue because there was no provision that
federal installations must "comply with all federal, state, interstate,
and local requirements . . . . " While the statute required that fed-
eral entities comply to the "same extent as natural persons,"' 2 1 it
failed to enumerate specific requirements which necessitated compli-
ance. Thus, the Court reasoned, federal facilities were not subject to
state enforcement of the permit requirements because there was no
unambiguous waiver of federal immunity on the subject.22
Following this decision, Congress amended the statute to subject
15. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179-80 (1976); Tribe, Intergovernmental Im-
munities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controver-
sies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 700-05 (1976).
16. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 453.
17. See text accompanying notes 3-7.
18. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
19. Id. at 169-72; Pub. L. No. 91-604, 118, 84 Stat. 1989 (1970). The section was
amended in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 711 (1977). The current version is at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418 (1982). The Court dealt during the same term with a similar provision in the Clean
Water Act. The Clean Water Act statute included the requirement that federal facilities pay
reasonable service charges. See EPA v. California ex rel, State Water Resources Control
Board, 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976).
20. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 182 (emphasis added). See also EPA v. California, 426 U.S.
at 211.
21. Hancock, 426 U.S. at 182.
22. Id. at 198.
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federal entities to all state requirements, "both procedural and sub-
stantive. ''  Congress did not, however, include language which ex-
pressly subjected the federal government to Clean Air taxes imposed
by the states.24 This could have easily been achieved had Congress
desired to make the change regardless of the fact that the decision
which was overruled by the statute did not directly address the issue
of taxes. 5
There have yet to be any federal pollution control statutes en-
acted regarding air, water, or waste that subject federal agencies to
anything more than service charges or certain enforcement penal-
ties.2 The conclusion which emerges from the current state of cir-
cumstances must be that Congress has not "unequivocally expressed"
any waiver of federal immunity to state environmental taxes."
Therefore, state environmental tax on a federal facility would run
afoul of the Supremacy Clause. It follows that the next question
23. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 711 (1977). The current version is at 42 U.S.C. § 7418
(1982). The Clean Water Act was similarly amended in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat.
1597-98 (1977). The current version is at 33 U.S.C. § 1151 (1982).
24. Nor were Clean Water taxes provided for.
25. The limited waivers of the Clean Air Act and similar statutes can be contrasted with
an express waiver of immunity to taxes in a statute governing low-level radioactive waste:
Low level radioactive waste owned or generated by the Federal Government
that is disposed of at a regional disposal facility or non-Federal disposal facility
within a State that is not a member of a compact shall be subject to the same
conditions, regulations, requirements, fees, taxes, and surcharges imposed by the
compact commission, and by the State in which such facility is located, in the
same manner and to the same extent as any low-level radioactive waste not
generated by the Federal Government.
42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(1)(B) (1982) (emphasis added). This provision demonstrates that Con-
gress expressly subjects federal facilities to state taxes when it wants.
An analogous situation to permit fees exists in the case of civil or criminal state penalties
for environmental violations. Federal facility liability for these penalties is limited to penalties
specifically mentioned in federal statutes. California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977, 978-79 (9th
Cir. 1984); Meyer v. United States Coast Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
"Congress could easily have stated that federal facilities would be liable not only to injunctive
relief but also to civil or criminal penalties. It is easier written than said. It is not written."
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 605 (E.D. Cal.
1986).
26. See text accompanying note 6. One might argue that because Congress has expressly
made federal facilities subject to reasonable service charges in some cases, it has negatively
implied that there is no federal installation liability for taxes that exceed the amount of what
would be a reasonable service charge. This argument is unnecessary for advocates of the view
that there is no waiver of federal immunity to state taxes. It is enough for such advocates that
there is a requirement that Congress unequivocally waive federal supremacy in the area of
state taxation as well as other areas. See text accompanying note 22.
27. Any supposed waiver of federal sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in
favor of the sovereign and may not be modified by implication, Library of Congress v. Shaw,
478 U.S. 310 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983).
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must be: How can one determine whether a state's environmental
permit fee is actually a tax?
III. WHEN IS A "FEE" REALLY A "TAX"?
A tax is an involuntary collection of funds which is not necessa-
rily related to any benefit bestowed by a government upon a tax-
payer. 8 The tax extracted provides support for the general public
good. However, a user fee or a service charge is a voluntary collec-
tion which a payer tenders in exchange for a benefit not shared by
the general public." The fee is paid in exchange for something. In
the case of a fee for an environmental permit, the permit itself is the
benefit bestowed upon the fee-payer. 0
The determination of whether a permit fee is a reasonable user
fee or an impermissible tax logically depends upon the constitutional
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. United
States."5 In Massachusetts, the Court reviewed the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts' protest of the national government's imposition of
a federal registration fee upon a state police helicopter. 2 This fee
was imposed on all non-military aircraft at a "flat rate" adjusted
upward for heavier aircraft and those with more powerful engines.38
The proceeds from the fee were used to provide certain benefits to all
air traffic. These benefits included take-off and landing assistance,
air traffic control, navigation assistance, and "miscellaneous"
services."'
The Massachusetts Court proceeded from the general rule that
one sovereign may not tax another: only "taxes that operate as user
28. See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340
(1974). The dissent in National Cable felt it unhelpful to attempt to draw a distinction be-
tween a "fee" and a "tax." It was felt that the question should be simply whether the charges
assessed were authorized by Congress. Id. at 352, 354 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After making
this observation, however, the dissent proceeded to draw a distinction between permissible and
impermissible charges. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). It is necessary to look behind the label of
the charge in order to find its true nature. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 492
(1958). This inquiry is best handled by determining the fundamental differences between a fee
and a tax. Cf. United States v. Maryland, 471 F. Supp. 1030, 1036 (C. Md. 1979) (analysis of
legal incidence of tax).
29. National Cable, 415 U.S. at 340-41.
30. 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1298.
31. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
32. Id. at 446.
33. Id. at 446 n.1.
34. The miscellaneous benefits included filing of flight plans, weather information, and
rescue operations. Id. at 447 n.2.
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fees may constitutionally be applied."35 The Court then applied a
three-pronged test to distinguish permissible user fees from imper-
missible taxes. The test used by the Court in Massachusetts was
originally set forth in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v.
Delta Airlines.0 In Massachusets, the Court held that the aircraft
registration charges were valid user fees rather than invalid taxes
because "the charges [did] not discriminate against [the fee payer],
[were] based on a fair approximation of use of the system, and
[were] structured to produce revenues that [would] not exceed the
total cost to the [government] of the benefits to be supplied . . . .""
Although the facts in Massachusetts concerned imposition of
federal charges upon state entities, the test is equally applicable to
cases involving state charges assessed against the national govern-
ment. The Court reasoned broadly and set forth principles that gov-
ern taxation of any sovereign by another. This follows from the fact
that the general characteristics of sovereignty are similar for both
state and national governments, though they possess different roots. 8
There has been very little treatment, either by the courts or the
commentaries, on the application of the three-pronged test in the
case of one sovereign taxing another. However, a comparison of com-
merce clause principles with the use of the test in Massachusetts sets
forth a framework of application for state-imposed permit fees."9
The first prong of the Massachusetts test is violated when a state
program exempts some entities, particularly state and local agencies,
from payment of the fees, but does not exempt other federal agencies.
In such a case, the application of the fee would clearly discriminate
against federal functions."' The Massachusetts Court was careful to
note the fact that federal aircraft, as well as the state's helicopter,
35. Id. at 463. Imposition of a user fee only requires that each member of a class of
special beneficiaries of a government program pay a reasonable approximation of the cost of its
fair share of the program. Id. at 454.
36. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
37. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 466-67.
38. The Court observed that commerce clause cases are "clearly" analogous to cases
involving a government's taxing power. Id. at 462. The same level of principles is involved in
protecting constitutionally valued activities from the potentially destructive interference of cer-
tain taxing measures. See also United States v. Maine, 524 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (D. Me.
1981).
39. Although this article discusses the constitutionality of applying state permit fees to
federal agencies, a similar analysis of the fees' impact on interstate commerce could conceivably
be undertaken for those cases in which they are applied to private enterprises engaged in
interstate commerce.
40. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 467. Cf Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536,
544-45 (1983) (States must treat the national government as well as they treat themselves with
regard to taxation of government instrumentalities.).
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were subject to the registration fee made the likelihood of any a dis-
crimination claims minimal.4
The case from which the Court in Massachusetts adopted its
test is instructive on the application of this prong. In Evansville-
Vanderburgh,42 the Court upheld the validity of a boarding fee
charged to "enplaning" passengers for the purpose of supporting op-
eration of an airport.4 A number of airlines asserted that the fee
unconstitutionally taxed interstate commerce in violation of the com-
merce clause." The Supreme Court set forth the threepronged test
and applied the discrimination prong to determine whether the fee
payer had shown an inherent difference between application of the
boarding fee to interstate and intrastate passenger flights. It was de-
termined that the difference must be such that application of the
same fee to both classes of flights would amount to discrimination
against one or the other class.4" Thus, while applying this prong to
permit fees imposed by states on federal facilities, one must examine
whether similarly situated entities, particularly states and their in-
strumentalities, are charged the same fees.46
Analysis of the second prong involves answering the question of
whether the fees are a fair approximation of the cost of the benefits
provided.4 In Massachusetts, the Court examined whether the fee
was geared to give weight to factors affecting the extent of use of the
benefits."' In Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Court examined whether
the boarding fees "related somehow" to the payer's use of the airport
facility.49 Thus, in order to be valid, the burden of the fee must be
distributed among users in a manner that takes into account their
proportionate use of the program for which the fee is collected. In
other words, the fee must approximate the value of the benefit
received.
Given the close attention that must be directed to issues affect-
ing federal sovereignty, it would appear that the state fee must be
more than merely "related somehow" to the federal agency's use of
the benefit or service provided.50 Nevertheless, the state need not take
41. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 467.
42. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 711.
45. Id. at 717.
46. See id. See also Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 467.
47. Id. at 466-67.
48. Id. at 468-69.
49. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 717-19.
50. See California v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 967-68, 971 (9th Cir. 1975). The immunity of
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into account every factor affecting the cost of the benefit to the fed-
eral entity. Such a requirement would be unduly burdensome and
would only increase the cost of services as a result of greater admin-
istrative expenses."
The analysis of the third prong does not appear to be entirely
distinct from that of the second prong, especially as applied by the
Court in Massachusetts. 2 This part of the test measures whether
the charge is structured to produce revenues that will not exceed the
regulating government's total cost of the benefits supplied. The ques-
tion then is whether the charge actually imposed is excessive in rela-
tion to the cost of the government benefit conferred upon the user.5"
Upholding the fee before it, the Massachusetts Court merely
noted that Congress had contemplated that the user fee would not be
sufficient to finance the federal expenditures on civil aviation in any
one year.54 Therefore, the amount of the fee did not exceed the cost
of the program. In Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Court compared
the precise dollar amounts collected to the amount required to run
the airport.5 5 This approach of comparing revenues to costs could
certainly be applied to state permit fee systems.
Another approach to this part of the analysis is to examine the
permit fee system's basic statutory and regulatory structure to deter-
mine whether it is highly likely to produce windfall profits for the
state's general fund. It is unclear whether this approach would be
within the analysis of the second or the third prongs of the test be-
cause, as noted above, the two prongs are not entirely distinct from
one another."
The Court in Massachusetts analyzed the structure of the regis-
tration fee before it within its discussion of the second part of the
the national government from state taxation is based upon the supremacy clause. Attempts to
invade this immunity must therefore be inspected closely. The immunity of the states from
federal taxation, on the other hand, has been judicially implied from the states' role in the
constitutional scheme. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 455. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 14, at 405-06.
51. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 463-64.
52. See id. at 472-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling the test "vague" and
"convoluted").
53. Id. at 466-67, 469. "The requirement that total revenues not exceed expenditures
places a natural ceiling on the total amount that such charges may generate ... ." Id. at 467.
The Court looked to the legislative history of the aviation fee statute to determine what Con-
gress considered to be a benefit. Id. at 467-68.
54. Id. at 469.
55. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 720.
56. See text accompanying note 52.
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test.57 Nonetheless, the terms of the test indicate that an examination
of the fee's' structure would be more appropriate under the third
prong: whether the charge is "structured to produce revenues that
will not exceed the total cost to the [collecting government] of the
benefits to be supplied."s
It is probably unimportant under which part of the test the
principles of this approach are discussed, as long as they are fairly
covered at some point. In any event, the charge must be structured so
that the fees collected do not exceed the state agency's cost of provid-
ing the particular benefits to the user. The possibility of a slight
overcharge, however, especially in the case of flat fees, is not offen-
sive to constitutional values.59 Any requirement of an exact match
between funds collected, and those actually spent on the program for
which they are collected, would be unduly burdensome to any regu-
latory program.6 °
Application of this three-part test to state environmental permit
programs would resolve the question of whether the fees charged by
states are unlawful taxes. For the most part, application of the test
would center on the state statutory and regulatory permit structure.
However, examination of actual budget items might be necessary to
determine whether the statutes and regulations, as applied, are
merely financing a state bureaucratic structure.
IV. A CASE STUDY: CALIFORNIA CLEAN AIR PERMIT FEES
The federal Clean Air Act6 requires states to prepare and sub-
mit implementation plans for attainment of clean air. 2 All states
have implemented statutory and regulatory apparatus to assist in
achieving national standards of air quality.6" As part of these appa-
ratus, the states require operators to pay fees and obtain permits for
those operations that pollute the air.64
The State of California's program is no exception to this prac-
tice.65 California's scheme allows local Air Pollution Management
57. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 468-69.
58. Id. at 466-67.
59. Id. at 466.
60. Such a requirement could cause administrative costs to increase to the point where
the fee payer's assessment would actually be increased above the assessment without the re-
quirement. See Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 716.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1983).
62. Id. § 7410(1).
63. See supra note 11.
64. See supra note 11.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42311 (West 1986).
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Districts to issue permits to "stationary" air pollution sources, such
as boilers and incinerators." The permits both allow the owner of a
stationary source to operate it and are a means of providing the air
management districts with information regarding pollution sources.
In order to finance district programs, the local districts are au-
thorized to charge "fees" when issuing a permit. 7 California Health
and Safety Code section 42311 states that local districts may adopt a
schedule of annual permit fees
[T]o cover the cost of district programs related to permitted sta-
tionary sources. . . . The fees assessed . . . shall not exceed,
for any fiscal year, the actual cost for district programs for the
immediately preceding fiscal year with an adjustment of not
greater than the change in the annual California Consumer
price index. . . . Any revenues received by the district pursuant
to the fees, which exceed the cost of the programs, shall be car-
ried over for expenditure in the subsequent fiscal year, and the
schedule of fees shall be changed to reflect that carryover. Every
person applying for a permit, [including federal, state, and local
agencies] shall pay the fees required by the schedule. Nothing in
this subdivision precludes the district from recovering, through
its schedule of annual fees, the estimated reasonable costs of dis-
trict programs related to permitted stationary sources.6"
The national government has numerous installations in Califor-
nia.69 These installations are regulated by the air quality manage-
ment districts70 and are considered financially able to pay permit
fees. Consequently, they are charged permit fees for the operation of
boilers, incinerators, fuel pumps, paint booths, and other polluting
activities. 71 Their potential liability for these fees provides an illus-
tration of the constitutional test set forth above.
The air quality management districts' billing to federal facilities
66. Id. §§ 42300-42311. Domestic and agricultural activities are exempt from the per-
mit requirement. Id. § 42310.
67. Id. § 42311. The label of the charge, as mentioned, is not determinative of its na-
ture. City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489, 492 (1958). Hazardous waste generator
fees have actually been labeled "taxes" by the California legislature, but local enforcement
agencies claim that they are fees. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25345-25347.5
(West Supp. 1988); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 43152.5 (West Supp. 1988).
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42311 (West Supp. 1989).
69. See Federal Facilities Docket, supra note 10, at 4283-85.
70. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Air Pollution Control District Rules, Rules 102,
203, 301 (1988). Other pollution-regulating programs bill fees for permitting activities ranging
from underground storage tanks to toxic pits. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25287 (stor-
age tanks), 25208.3 (toxic pits) (West Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 29
1989] STATE ENVIRONMENTAL PERMIT FEES 891
for permit fees does not appear to run afoul of the first prong of the
Massachusetts test which prohibits discriminatory treatment.72 The
fees are applied to all entities, private and governmental, engaged in
stationary air polluting activities. 73 Each of these entities must obtain
a permit and pay the required fees. 7 '
Neither is there any apparent inherent difference between the
activities of federal facility polluters and other polluters that would
make application of the fees discriminatory. 7' The fact that state in-
strumentalities also pay the fees minimizes, if not eliminates, any
argument that imposition of the permit fees on federal facilities is an
abuse of the taxing power for reasons of discrimination.76
Proper application of the next two prongs to the permit fees
indicates a problem in the framework of the California statute and
accompanying regulations. The second prong requires an inquiry
into whether the fees are allocated among users of the benefit pro-
vided by the state according to "some fair approximation of use."'77
The first step necessary in order to answer this inquiry consists
of identifying the "benefit" provided to the fee payer. The benefit
provided in exchange for the payment of the permit fee is the actual
permit which allows the payer to operate a stationary air polluting
device. The benefit received must be one that accrues specifically to
72. If a state permit scheme fails this prong of the test, then the inquiry is over. There is
no need to proceed to analysis of the other prongs since a state statute that imposes burdens on
the national government not shared by other entities is invalid. United States v. County of
Cook, 725 F.2d 1128, 1131 (7th Cir. 1984). If the scheme violates the other two prongs,
however, there may be room for negotiation to agree upon a reasonable fee. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-10.
73. A contrast may be made to underground storage tank fees which California seeks to
impose upon federal agencies under authority of the federal Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1982). The California Health & Safety Code allows state and local
instrumentalities to obtain waivers for underground storage tank fees. Id. § 25287 (West
Supp. 1988).
A fruitful area of inquiry may exist in the case of California "subvention funds." Califor-
nia Constitutional and Government Code provisions mandate that the state provide subvention
funds to local governments for certain state program costs. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIB, § 6; CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 17514, 17550 (West Supp. 1989). See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§
2207, 2207.5 (West 1987). If these funds actually reimburse local agencies for permit fees they
have paid to state environmental agencies, in addition to merely reimbursing them for cost of
running state programs, then the permit program would discriminate against the national gov-
ernment, which is not reimbursed. A factual inquiry would be necessary to see how the sub-
vention funds are distributed since it is not apparent from the face of the different laws.
74. See supra text accompanying note 43.
75. See supra text accompanying note 43.
76. See supra text accompanying note 42.
77. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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the payer of the fee and not to the public at large."' Thus, the pre-
vention or study of air pollution in the vicinity of the federal installa-
tion is not included as a benefit accruing to the fee payer. This type
of activity benefits the public at large. Only the grant of the permit
in exchange for payment of the charge bestows a benefit not shared
by other citizens."
The legislative history of the federal Clean Air Act Amend-
ments supports the conclusion that the benefit bestowed is limited to
the permit itself and related services. The legislative history identifies
the types of benefits Congress envisioned in allowing state agencies
to regulate installations of the national government.80
Although service charges are not mentioned specifically in the
statute, they are discussed in the committee reports. These reports
note that a permit fee paid by a federal facility must be in exchange
for and commensurate with a benefit received.8 In the case of Clean
Air Act service charges, the "benefit" is intended to be the value of
the permitting authority's services, including the review and ap-
proval of the permit application, and the assurance that the permit-
tee is meeting the requirements which allow the continuance of the
use of a scarce public natural resource-clean air.8
In light of the above, the California Air Quality Management
Districts' permit fees must be related to the value of the state services
rendered in regard to the issuing of permits and must be fairly allo-
cated among all recipients of the permits in order to be truly valid
user fees. Answering the question of whether the fees are related to
the value of the permits requires a study of the cost of processing and
monitoring the permits. Whether the burden of the fees is fairly allo-
cated among users of the permits, however, could be determined
from an examination of the regulatory structure of the fees, as well
as from a study of permit costs.
The regulatory fee structure provides that the fees are com-
monly assessed according to a sliding scale. 8 Heatproducing equip-
ment is assessed according to the amount of heat generated, as mea-
78. United States v. Maine, 524 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (D. Me. 1981).
79. See Mississippi Power and Light v. NRC, 601 F.2d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 1979). See
also National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).
80. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. III (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE,
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1077, 1298. The reports indicated that the permits were the intended
benefits. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., San Bernardino County Air Pollution Control District Rules, Rule 301(n)
(1988).
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sured in British Thermal Units. 4 However, spray painting booths
and fuel pumps are assessed according to a flat rate. 5 The difference
in permit fee costs for these different types of equipment can be
nearly two thousand dollars.86
In Massachusetts, the registration fee was imposed on a sliding
scale based on aircraft weight and engine type.87 The Court did not
object to this structure, noting that legislative history behind Con-
gress' adoption of the registration fee indicated that heavier and
faster aircraft were generally more responsible for the need for so-
phisticated control, approach and landing facilities. 8
In Evansville-Vanderburgh, only commercial flights on large
aircraft were subject to the boarding fee as opposed to light and non-
commercial aircraft. 9 The Court addressed distinctions in fees based
on aircraft weight or commercial versus private use. The Court
noted that these distinctions did not render the charges wholly irra-
tional as a measure of relative use of airport facilities by those who
benefited from the use.90
In both of these cases, the scaled nature of the charges was
found reasonable or. the basis that the users of larger aircraft were
the primary beneficiaries of the benefits purchased by the user fees.
This reasoning can be distinguished from the case of permit fees.
The cost of the benefits purchased with the permit fee-the review
of a permit application, issuance of a permit, and monitoring of the
permittee-is not greatly affected by the size or nature of the equip-
ment licensed. Certainly, the nature and size of the equipment would
not have any substantial monetary affect."1 Thus, the allocation of
the fee under California regulations is not sufficiently related to the
fee payer's proportionate use of the permit system.
The federal facility may very well profit from the differential in
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. This method of assessment appears to be common.
87. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 446 n.1 (1978).
88. Id. at 451 n.9.
89. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1972).
90. Id. at 719.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. A state seeking to have its fee structure
approved either through negotiations or the judicial process would want to argue that the
benefit bestowed upon the fee payer goes beyond the mere administrative value of the permit
and includes the market value of the right to operate a piece of equipment or a certain produc-
tion activity. This market value would seem to increase with the size of the equipment. This
argument could be rebutted with the fact that the permit is a pollution control and monitoring
device rather than a marketing or business license.
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fees if the kind of equipment it operates is assessed on the lower end
of the fee scale. Nonetheless, it is only logical that, in such a case,
the Court would find the charge is structured as a tax. Accordingly,
the fee would fail the second prong of the Massachusetts test because
it is not fairly allocated among all users. The mere fact that the
payer complaining of the tax could somehow profit from it would not
appear to transform the tax into a permissible user's fee. However,
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts held that the likelihood of a
finding that the registration fee is valid is enhanced by the fact that
the state is required to pay less under an imperfectly allocated fee
structure than it would under a perfect user fee system.92
Analysis of the third prong of the test is less cryptic than that of
the second and should indicate more clearly the legality of the
charge. Whether the charge is structured to produce revenue that
will exceed the cost to the state of supplying the permit may depend
upon a comparison of total fees collected with the total cost of the
permit program. This approach was taken by the Supreme Court in
Evansville-Vanderburgh.9
If the state is reaping a surplus of funds that is not being ex-
pended to produce the permits, especially those granted to federal
agencies, then the charge is characterized as a tax.94 As indicated
above, the cost of a permit program is generally limited to the ex-
penses of permit application review, administrative issuance of the
permit, and inspection of the operation to ensure that the permit
conditions are being complied with.95 In other words, a time and
materials basis for the value of the permit is the proper measure.
The California air pollution permit fee system emerges from
evaluation under the third prong more easily characterized as a tax
than a fee. Federal facilities are assessed the fees based on the type
of equipment being operated rather than on the time and material
value of the permit itself." The large amounts assessed to certain
types of equipment may not be related, directly or indirectly, to the
value of the permit and are apparently structured to exceed the per-
mit's actual value.
The Evansville-Vanderburgh approach of comparing the total
fees collected to the total costs of the benefit to all fee payers must be
92. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 465-66.
93. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 405 U.S. at 719-20.
94. The value of this approach is considerable in light of its past use by the Supreme
Court. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 450 n.8, 470 & n.24.
95. See supra text accompanying note 91.
96. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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applied strictly in the case of permit fees demanded from federal in-
stallations. Principles of national sovereignty require that state reve-
nues be compared to the cost of the specific permit issued to the fed-
eral entity rather than to the cost of all permits issued to all
operators of air polluting equipment."7 It is unclear whether it
would be easier to attach a value to the specific permits issued to
federal installations than to all permits issued to all fee payers. This
would depend upon whether a particular type of formula had been
used to set the fees in the first place. Regardless, if the fees levied are
very high, then the charges will be interpreted as being structured
with the intention to produce general revenue rather than to cover
the cost of issuing and monitoring the particular permit.
The California statute itself indicates that the intent behind the
fee structure was not merely to cover the cost of the permits.98 The
statute allows the air pollution districts to recoup all air pollution
regulatory costs under the guise of "permit fees." 99 While it does set
fees for "evaluation, issuance, and renewal" of permits to cover the
cost of district programs related to permitted stationary "sources...
not otherwise funded," the statute also allows the fees to finance "the
actual cost of district programs. ' 0 The cost of the permit should not
include the value of those programs that are not related to the permit
process.
Therefore, it appears from the statute's language that the fee
payer is not only paying for permit overhead costs. The payer is also
supporting the district pollution program for all "stationary
sources." Notice, rule-making, general air quality testing, public ed-
ucation, meetings, site mitigation, and other measures could be subsi-
dized from the fees. These items are outside of the permit process.
The general benefits they produce are clean air, education, and dem-
ocratic participation for the public at large, rather than a specific
benefit to the fee payer. 10 Factual investigation may be necessary to
establish the validity of these points, but it is likely that the points
97. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 455. In Evansville-Vanderburgh, the Court deter-
mined that the actual funds collected by the state did not have to be earmarked for application
to the airport facilities for which use they were collected. It was permissible for the funds to go
into a general fund "so long as the funds received by local authorities under the statute are not
shown to exceed their airport costs . . . ." 405 U.S. at 720.
98. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42311(a) (West 1986).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Cf United States v. Maine, 524 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (D. Me. 1981). (Benefits
furnished to public generally in the form of consumer protection measures were not benefits
running specifically to fee payers.).
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will be validated. 10 2
Air quality management districts may also redistribute the fee
revenues to cities or counties as consideration for issuing permits for
activities within their jurisdictions.'03 In such cases, the amount
redistributed should be examined closely to determine whether it ap-
proximates the city or county permit overhead costs. If it does not, or
if the amount given to the city or county is only a fraction of the
total fees collected, then the fee would appear to be supporting
general, unrelated programs and would, accordingly, be
impermissible. 104
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT
In cases in which a federal installation disputes the constitution-
ality of a state permit fee, the first step should be negotiations to
reach a settlement. The goal of negotiations should be to arrive at a
fee level that will do no more than compensate the state agency for
its costs of providing the permit services to the specific federal
facility.
The potential rewards of such negotiations in terms of avoiding
litigation are clear. There are, however, legal concerns which may
leave the validity of any settlement in doubt. One concern is the
principle set forth above that if a tax on the national government is
deemed discriminatory, then the tax cannot be exacted at all.",
This principle should apply not only to taxes that fail the first,
102. It is conceivable that the language in the statute allowing districts to collect fees "to
cover the cost of district programs related to permitted stationary sources" could be read re-
strictively or could be vigorously exercised to produce the result that the fees are meant to
cover only district permit programs. Any broader reading would render the fees invalid when
applied to federal facilities. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42311(a) (West 1986).
103. Id. § 42312.
104. Air pollution control districts could be providing inspection services or technical
advice to permit recipients in order to facilitate issuance and monitoring of the permit. In such
a case, the fee should be evaluated to see whether it is a fair evaluation of these services. In
any case, if the facts show that the fee runs into thousands of dollars, it would seem that the
fee should be presumed a tax. It is improbable that such a high cost could be justified as a
"reasonable user fee" given the amount of "benefits" states normally provide to the permit
holder.
If a judicial enforcement action is undertaken to collect the fees, it is probable that the
issue will be resolved on a motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. A
state would want to produce facts showing for what the fees are used and how they are calcu-
lated in order to demonstrate disputed facts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. This tactic may save the
statutory and regulated framework of the fee from being declared facially invalid.
105. Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744, 751-52 (1961). See supra note
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discriminatory, prong of the Massachusetts test, but also to taxes
that do not pass the requirements of the second and third prongs.
The same constitutional concerns apply to an illegal tax of a federal
entity regardless of why the tax is illegal. The tax burdens essential
functions of government and, consequently, must be prohibited." 6
Another principle concern is that the Anti-Deficiency Act for-
bids an employee of the federal government from obligating funds for
purposes other than those for which Congress has appropriated.1 7
Congress does not appropriate funds for the purpose of paying ille-
gal taxes. Any use of operation and maintenance funds for the pay-
ment of the tax, therefore, could theoretically leave the authorizing
employee open to prosecution.' Such use would also cause the facil-
ity to reduce operational programs and maintenance of property,
thus, interfering with the facility's accomplishment of its mission.
In light of these concerns, the federal permit holder may refuse
to negotiate the amount of the fee until the state amends its statutes
and rules to the point where it only seeks to exact a service charge
that meets constitutional criteria. However, a federal installation's
refusal to pay or negotiate would carry the risk of the state's revoca-
tion of the permit.'09 The federal entity would then be forced into
the position of having to operate without a permit or face state en-
forcement measures. The state would be in the equally awkward sit-
uation of attempting to enforce action against the federal
government.
The best resolution of the above no-win situation either re-
quires that: 1) states amend their permit fees to constitute reasonable
user fees; or 2) Congress enact legislation authorizing federal instru-
mentalities' payment of state environmental user fees and taxes.
The first solution may be technically difficult to achieve. As
noted previously, complex budgetary adjustments and fund-tracking
mechanisms may be necessary to ensure that charges collected from
federal activities are placed in fund accounts devoted to servicing
only those activities. These mechanisms would be more costly and
106. Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 466-67.
107. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
108. Id. § 1350. Cf Hanash, Effects of the Anti-Deficiency Act on Federal Facilities'
Compliance with Hazardous Waste Laws, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10541,
10544-45 (1988).
109. The installation would then have to operate its stationary source of air pollution
without a permit, or cease operating thereby endangering the performance of its mission. If
operation continued, the state environmental agency could then issue an administrative cease
and desist order. Litigation would ensue. If this problem is likely to arise, then either party
may wish to seek declaratory relief.
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more difficult to control than the use of simple rate structures and
general funds in which all fees are placed. There are, however, com-
puter budgeting programs that can help states keep track of services
rendered to federal facilities on a time and materials basis.11 A re-
fund system may also be required to ensure that money collected
from a federal facility which is not used to provide benefits to the
facility is returned.
The second solution would require a congressional waiver of
federal immunity to state environmental taxes. The waiver would
have to be placed in each federal environmental act to ensure suffi-
cient specificity of the waiver. The language for such a waiver could
be borrowed from the express waiver that occurs in an.existing stat-
ute governing radioactive waste disposal. Congress would have to
add the term "taxes" to the statutes which already allow user fees.11
It would then be necessary to appropriate funds to pay the taxes.
However, since Congress intends to place the primary burden of en-
forcing pollution-control laws upon state governments, it should be
willing to institute the waiver and'appropriate the funds.11
VI. CONCLUSION
When a state seeks to impose an environmental permit fee upon
a federal installation, it may be exceeding its authority under the
Federal Constitution if the fee is in fact a tax. Before such a fee is
paid, it should be evaluated with the three-pronged test set forth in
Massachusetts v. United States to determine whether the permit fee
is a lawful "user fee" or an unconstitutional tax.
Thus, the charge should be examined to determine whether: 1)
its application discriminates against the federal government; 2) it is
based on a fair approximation of use of the system it supports; and
3) it is structured to produce revenues that will not exceed the total
cost to the state of the benefits supplied. If application of the charge
fails any prong, then it should not be paid by the federal installation.
In response, the state should conform the fee structure to the
requirements of the three-pronged test. Finally, the state should ac-
110. One such program is the "CALSTARS" system currently used by the California
State Water Resource Board. CALSTARS is a cost and time allocation system which permits
the board to bill according to hours and expenses spent on each individual installation.
111. See supra text accompanying note 24.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9. Because the problem could exist nation-
wide, federal legislation would go far toward putting an end to ad hoc attempts to resolve the
issue. The legislation could set up a schedule of how fees may be calculated, or it could ex-
pressly make federal governments subject to state environmental taxes.
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tively seek congressional approval to impose environmental taxes on
federal facilities within its boundaries. Both of these courses of re-
sponsive action by concerned states are preferable to the litigation
and administrative disputes currently developing throughout the
country.

